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Abstract: In Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS), the power of the crowd, jointly with the sensing
capabilities of the smartphones they wear, provides a new paradigm for data sensing. Scenarios
involving user behavior or those that rely on user mobility are examples where standard sensor
networks may not be suitable, and MCS provides an interesting solution. However, including human
participation in sensing tasks presents numerous and unique research challenges. In this paper,
we analyze three of the most important: user participation, data sensing quality and user anonymity.
We tackle the three as a whole, since all of them are strongly correlated. As a result, we present
PaySense, a general framework that incentivizes user participation and provides a mechanism to
validate the quality of collected data based on the users’ reputation. All such features are performed
in a privacy-preserving way by using the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. Rather than a theoretical one,
our framework has been implemented, and it is ready to be deployed and complement any existing
MCS system.
Keywords: mobile crowd sensing; cryptocurrencies; reputation systems; privacy; bitcoin
1. Introduction
Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) arises as a new sensing paradigm based on the power of the crowd
jointly with the sensing capabilities of smartphones. The increasing popularity of such devices paired
with the inherent mobility of their owners enables the ability to acquire local knowledge from the
individual’s surrounding environment. This local knowledge ranges from location information to
more specialized data, such as pollution levels, going through a longer list of personal and surrounding
context, noise levels or traffic awareness, among others.
A large number of crowd sensing applications have already been developed, although typically
for experimental purposes and to show the usefulness of such a sensing paradigm. For instance,
Eisenman et al. [1] harnesses the sensing capabilities of smartphones paired with the individual’s
smartness to determine the most “bikeable” routes in a city. Similarly, the Common Sense project [2]
allows individuals to measure their personal exposure to air pollution and share it with their social
sphere. On the other hand, applications such as Nericell [3] measure the interaction between
individuals to infer the context within which they carry out their activities. Furthermore, using
environmental sound and mobile devices’ microphones, Xu et al. [4] developed a system capable of
counting the number of people in a place. The system could distinguish different people with no
previous knowledge of them. Other systems, like the one proposed by Rosen et al. [5], have shown
how MCS could be also used for improving WLAN performance, by periodically sampling the WiFi
performance using mobile devices with a negligible battery impact.
However, MCS presents numerous and unique research challenges, most of them based on the
fact that human participation is in the loop, and range from participatory and opportunistic data
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collection, proper incentive mechanisms, transient network communication and big data processing.
Nonetheless, human participation raises singular issues regarding the privacy and security of data,
as sensitive information, such as human voice or location, may be revealed. Furthermore, the quality
and trustworthiness of the contributed data (e.g., counterfeit data contributed by malicious users)
should also be addressed.
In this paper, the PaySense system is described, and an exhaustive security analysis is performed.
The main contributions of our proposal are the following. We provide a secure general framework
that can be used in any MCS application to economically reward users by paying them bitcoins.
The provided system also allows one to keep track of every user’s reputation, a value that can be
used for the MCS application in the data validation process. Furthermore, the system provides a high
degree of user privacy since Bitcoin addresses are used as user pseudonyms, and the system takes
special care in avoiding linkability threads, a well-known problem of Bitcoin transactions. Finally, the
system has been implemented and is publicly available to be included in any MCS application [6].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a review of the state of
the art focused on three important challenges in MCS: user participation, data sensing quality and
user anonymity. Section 3 introduces the Bitcoin cryptocurrency and how it can be applied for user
rewarding and reputation accountability. In Section 4, we describe the PaySense system, providing
detailed information on the system entities and their interactions, taking special care about users
privacy. In Section 5, we perform an exhaustive security analysis of PaySense, providing a clear
adversary model and detailing all of the security measures that have been developed to mitigate
possible attacks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and gives some guidelines for further research.
2. State of the Art
The structure of this section is based on the three main challenges of MCS addressed in PaySense:
user participation, data sensing quality and user anonymity. The main proposals appearing in the
literature are summarized, and the interrelation between those three challenges is also outlined in
this section.
2.1. User Participation
MCS systems typically involve a very large number of users or crowd sensors in the sensing
task by collecting and sending local data obtained through their sensor-enabled mobile devices to
a data collection center. The performance and usefulness of such sensor networks heavily depends
on the crowd sensor’s willingness to participate in the data collection process. Therefore, incentive
mechanisms are of utmost importance in MCS scenarios to engage as many crowd sensors and to
provide the data collection center with a considerable wealth of data.
Based on the nature of user participation, we can discern between two MCS paradigms,
as introduced by Lane et al. [7]: participatory sensing and opportunistic sensing. The first sensing
paradigm requires the user to have complete consciousness of what, where and when it is being
sensed. For instance, it may require the users to observe and describe their surrounding environment,
typically assuming a higher degree of involvement for the crowd sensors. On the other hand,
in opportunistic sensing scenarios, the data is acquired in the background, namely the data are
being sensed opportunistically and automatically sent (i.e., without the user’s active participation)
using the device’s network connection to the data collection center. Even though it may seem that
users would be more willing to participate in this kind of scenario, battery wastage or large amounts
of data being sent may cause the user to refuse to participate in sensing tasks.
The design of incentive mechanisms to stimulate participation has been addressed in crowd
sensing scenarios [8], although similar needs were previously identified in the field of ad hoc or
P2P networks [9], which also relay on the participant’s willingness, in that case to forward packets.
The nature of the incentives provided to crowd sensors allows its classification on the following
categories: economic, service-based and social [10,11].
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The incentives mechanisms in the first category model the problem through a financial approach
where crowd sensors get paid or receive some kind of credit based on the provided service [12].
However, the lack, until now, of an easy to use, inexpensive and secure micro-payment system pushes
towards dealing with external entities, such as banks or financial institutions that impose too high
transaction fees for a practical pay-per-sense solution.
On the other hand, service-based incentives try to foster participation by taking a user-centric
approach in which feedback or individual benefits are perceived by the crowd sensors in a way that
is relevant to them [13]. However, not all sensing scenarios may fall into such categories, since the
sensing objective may not be of interest or provides no benefits to the crowd sensors.
Finally, gamification techniques have also been used to incentivize participation in mobile
crowd sensing applications [14] in what we consider a “social” reward. However, apparently, the
effectiveness of such incentive schemes depends considerably on a large set of interrelated factors from
community-related (topic, number of participants, etc.) to cultural or motivational factors [15]. This
multitude of determinants makes it difficult to assess if the gamification scheme would work in all
given MCS scenarios.
2.2. Data Sensing Quality
In MCS systems, there is no control over the crowd sensors, and we cannot assume that all
individuals will behave in the exact same manner or will be equally honest. Therefore, the overall
quality of the sensor readings can see itself deteriorated if counterfeit data are received from malicious
users. Hence, the obvious question is how to validate the sensing data that crowd sensors provide
to the system. A commonly-used approach is to validate the data depending on the trust level of the
crowd sensor that reports it [16].
Trust and reputation systems have long been studied to establish trust relations among the
members of an on-line community where prior knowledge of the participants may not even be
available or where the community is formed by a crowd of anonymous volunteers. In such systems,
each user is provided with a reputation score that indicates his or her trustworthiness when acting as
the information provider. For instance, Jøsang et al., in [17], introduce several reputation quantification
models, while [18] presents a reputation framework based on fuzzy logic in the context of social
participatory sensing. Such reputation scores can be increased each time a crowd sensor provides
valid data.
Nevertheless, a validation scheme based only on the user’s reputation as a sensing data reliability
measure does not provide a useful method since, in an initial state, the system could not identify any
crowd sensor as trustworthy, leading it towards a deadlock state. In order to avoid such situations, a
combination of reputation systems and collective knowledge can be applied [19].
Data Quality vs. Incentive Mechanisms
Combining both reputation systems and incentive mechanisms in the context of an MCS
application is especially sensitive. Given the self-interested and possibly selfish nature of individuals,
there exists the possibility of crowd sensors acting in a way to maximize their own gains, regardless
of the impact that this may have on the overall sensor network. With higher incentives provided
for participation, the more motivated the crowd sensors will be to increase their personal benefits
possibly by providing misleading information. Therefore, improving the design of an incentive
mechanism should imply an improvement of the corresponding quality control process and, hence,
of the reputation system.
2.3. User Anonymity
An important aspect of MCS scenarios is the collection of potentially sensitive information
pertaining to individuals [20]. For instance, Global Positioning System (GPS) sensor readings can
be used to track users’ movements and profile them for other purposes besides their crowd sensing
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tasks. Furthermore, if the MCS application collects “delicate” information, such as criminal acts, crowd
sensors may be reluctant to provide data without proper anonymity measures for the fear of being
collaterally involved in such acts. Hence, it is necessary to preserve the privacy of crowd sensors, but
at the same time to ensure the usefulness of the MCS application.
A popular approach for preserving users’ privacy is to use pseudonyms when sending sensed
data to the data collection center (see [21], for example). These pseudonyms are typically randomly
generated and bare no relation to the individual’s real identity. In these cases, we say that individuals
benefit from pseudo-anonymity, since we cannot infer their real identity from the pseudonyms, but we
can still identify subsequent sensor readings as reported by the same user with the same pseudonym.
Another approach is to remove any user identifying attribute from the sensing data before sending
them to the data collection center [5]. Obviously, this approach can be applied only in those MCS
applications that are solely interested in the actual data, and no further interaction with the crowd
sensors is necessary.
However, user identification not only can be achieved by the identification of the source of
the sensed information, but also with the sensed information itself. It is well known that some
spatiotemporal patterns can be used to identify users in a system [22]. To avoid these anonymity
threads, a privacy-preserving mechanism, like k-anonymity resistance, can be deployed. Such
techniques have already been successfully proposed in mobile crowd sensing scenarios to reduce the
risk of identification when crowd sensors provide their location [23].
2.3.1. Anonymity vs. Incentive Mechanisms
The crowd sensor should be able to provide sensing data in an anonymous way while still
perceiving incentives for that task, and at the same time, crowd sensor network authorities should be
able to ensure that dishonest users cannot earn unlimited credit.
Few works can be found in the literature dealing with this problem. In [24], the authors analyze
the interaction between privacy and incentive mechanisms, when anonymization mechanisms are
applied over the sensed data. The analysis is focused on how privacy mechanisms affect the price of
data sensing when the incentive mechanism is based on the greedy incentive algorithm [25]. However,
anonymization is focused on sensed data, and there is no information on how users are identified in the
system. Li and Cao [26] propose an incentive scheme where users are rewarded for their contributions
with tokens (credits) that can later be exchanged for additional services or for real-world objects.
Unfortunately, the incentive scheme relies on a trusted third party to ensure that the anonymity of the
users is preserved by applying blind signatures and commitment techniques.
2.3.2. Anonymity vs. Reputation Systems
An anonymous reputation system may seem an apparent paradox considering that an anonymous
system requires complete unlinkability between the user’s identity and the sensed data, while
reputation systems claim this link to be existent in order to maintain an updated reputation score for
each user.
In [27], the authors acknowledged the importance of a privacy-preserving reputation system.
While rarely explored in the context of MCS networks, this has been addressed in peer-to-peer networks,
where users are allowed to create multiple pseudonyms, each with its own reputation score, to achieve
anonymity [28]. Then, different pseudonyms may be used in different interactions with other entities,
forcing adversaries to trace sequences of pseudonyms used by the same individual in order to reveal
their identity.
Having different pseudonyms, each with its own reputation score, however, is detrimental to
the reputation system, which should be continuous and applicable transversely to all pseudonyms
corresponding to the same user. Miranda and Rodrigues develop this idea in [29] and provide a
mechanism that allows users to transfer the reputation information from one pseudonym to another,
without disclosing this link or the user’s real identity.
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However, if not properly performed, reputation transfer between pseudonyms may provide a
linkage mechanism. Take, for example, an individual having the highest reputation score among
all pseudonyms. Then, it would be straightforward for an adversary to establish a link between
this pseudonym and the pseudonym conserving the same reputation score after the transfer process.
Christin et al. [30] discuss this issue and provide a solution in the context of participatory sensing.
They also acknowledge the need of a trusted third party to ensure that anonymity is preserved in
such scenarios. However, the main drawback of their proposal is that users lose reputation in favor of
pseudonym unlinkability, but the lost reputation could not be recovered.
Finally, the possibility of changing pseudonyms may allow a Sybil attack, where malicious users
may replicate sensor readings under different pseudonyms to earn more reputation or credit, so new
measures have to be developed to enforce that every crowd sensor only has a valid pseudonym at a
given time.
3. Bitcoins: The Integration Tool
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency system [31] that emerged in early 2009, and it has been rapidly adopted
due to its three main properties: security, decentralization and user anonymity (see [32] for detailed
information on the Bitcoin system). Bitcoin system security is based on elliptic curve public key
cryptography together with the help of hash functions; its one-wayness provides a way to define
an easily verifiable and fine-grained adjustable proof-of-work. Furthermore, double-spending is
prevented by maintaining a public non-modifiable ledger, the blockchain, which includes all performed
transactions. On the other hand, regarding decentralization, no central authority is supposed to control
the Bitcoin payment system. Instead, a distributed approach has been adopted for data storage and
data transmission using the Bitcoin peer to peer (P2P) network. Such a distributed approach has
different sides: data storage, data confirmation and data transmission. The core information of the
Bitcoin system is included in the so-called blockchain, which is stored in every full-client node of the
Bitcoin system in order to be able to validate new transactions. On the other hand, new transactions
are confirmed by adding them to the blockchain through the mining process, a process that is also
distributed and that can be performed by any user of the Bitcoin network using specific-purpose
software (and hardware). Mining bitcoins helps to confirm the transactions performed, and it has been
designed to be a hard task. Using the concept of proof-of-work in order to provide a significant level
of security to the Bitcoin network, the effort of validating Bitcoin information is rewarded, mainly,
with the new bitcoins that are constantly created. Finally, the Bitcoin system needs to disseminate
different kinds of information, essentially the payment transactions performed by users and the
blockchain (or its actualization). The system transmits such information over the Internet through a
distributed P2P overlay. Such a network is created by Bitcoin users in a dynamic way, and nodes of the
Bitcoin P2P network are computers running the software of the Bitcoin network node. In regards to
anonymity, Bitcoin achieves such a property by allowing users to create any number of anonymous
Bitcoin addresses that will be used in their Bitcoin transactions.
Bitcoins are not digital objects, but an accounting entry in a Bitcoin account. Each Bitcoin account
is identified by its Bitcoin address, and such an address is tied to an elliptic curve public key pair.
Payments in the Bitcoin system are performed through transactions, which indicate the source address
(the payer) and the destination address (the payee) of the Bitcoin payment. The payment destination
can be determined only with the Bitcoin address, a public value known by any Bitcoin user, while
the source of the payment is validated through a digital signature performed using the private key,
a secret value only known by the owner of the source Bitcoin address.
Allowing multiple Bitcoin address generation in an anonymous way is a good starting point to
achieve a good anonymity degree. However, the underlying non-anonymous Internet infrastructure
used to propagate Bitcoin information, together with the availability of all Bitcoin transactions,
has proven to be a potential anonymity threat, as different authors have pointed out [33,34].
However, as we will show later on, using existing tools like anonymous channels and Bitcoin mixing
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networks allows one to obtain a practical anonymous payment mechanism that can be applied to our
MCS scenario.
3.1. Bitcoins as a Rewarding Mechanism
As a payment system, Bitcoin is a straightforward method to reward users in an MCS scenario.
For each sensing value crowd sensors provide, they receive a Bitcoin payment as an awarded reward.
Users can generate their Bitcoin addresses that will be used as rewarding addresses where the payer,
probably the data collection center, using its own Bitcoin address, will send the Bitcoin payments for
the sensing tasks the users perform.
Here, different properties of the Bitcoin currency system should be emphasized. First of all,
bitcoins are suitable as a micro-payment system, since its eight decimal division provides a small
enough granularity to define an efficient pay-per-sense model. On the other hand, Bitcoin payments
do not need any intermediary between the payer and the payee, so the protocols for rewarding are
straightforward since they do not involve any third party. Finally, it is worth mentioning that although
fees applied to Bitcoin payments are lower than those in regular electronic payment systems (like
credit cards), they are not low enough to use regular bitcoin payments as micropayments. Furthermore,
despite the economic inconvenience of the fees, micropayments performed directly on standard Bitcoin
payments are not recommended for efficiency reasons. Fortunately, Bitcoin allows one to create smart
contracts where a micropayment channel can be established. Using such a channel, micropayments
can be performed efficiently and with negligible fees.
On the other hand, when users’ privacy has to be taken into account, all mechanism used in the
system have to provide a certain degree of anonymity. In this case, taking Bitcoin as the payment
system to reward users is a good strategy due to the anonymity level provided by such virtual currency.
As we already mentioned, Bitcoin anonymity is based on the easiness of anonymous Bitcoin addresses
generation that will be used for the Bitcoin payments. For that reason, crowd sensors providing
sensing data may generate multiple Bitcoin addresses, and the rewarding amount a user has to receive
for all of his or her submitted reports could be spread over different Bitcoin addresses used for the
rewarding payment.
3.2. Bitcoins as a Reputation Annotation Mechanism
As we already mentioned in Section 2.2, reputation measures may be used to assess the quality of
the information that users send to the data collection center. Sensing data may be accepted or discarded
based on the reputation value of the user reporting such data. Our approach is to adopt bitcoins also as
a reputation annotation system, tying the concepts of reward and reputation. Such an approach could
seem a limitation, since the unification of both concepts in a unique value implies that the reward
system determines the reputation score and conversely. Nevertheless, from a conceptual point of view,
reward and reputation concepts are closely related. Notice that reward for a given sensed value can be
seen as a measure of the correctness of such a value, since reward should depend on the usefulness of
that value. Following such an approach, the balance in a specific Bitcoin address will represent both
the total awarded bitcoins for the sensing tasks reported with such Bitcoin address and the reputation
obtained for the tasks.
Representing both concepts, reward and reputation, as the balance of a Bitcoin address has an
interesting implication. For a Bitcoin address used with this purpose (reward and reputation), each
further payment represents a withdrawal of economic funds, since bitcoins are transferred to another
Bitcoin address, but also implies a reputation reduction. Conversely, users may desire to reduce their
reputation in exchange for receiving some benefit. In that case, the associated withdrawal would
be such a benefit. At first glance, it may not seem obvious the need for reputation reduction in an
MCS scenario, but as we point out in Section 4.4, anonymous reputation schemes using multiple
pseudonyms need to reduce users’ reputation in order to provide the unlinkability of pseudonyms.
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4. The PaySense System
In this section, we describe PaySense, a Bitcoin-based system that provides an integrated
mechanism for reward and reputation in MCS applications while preserving crowd sensors’ anonymity.
The system can be seen as a plug-in for any MCS application that wants to reward its users to increase
their engagement in the crowd sensing tasks. Furthermore, the MCS application also obtains from
PaySense a mechanism to trace user’s reputation. As different proposals have been described [19],
such a reputation value can be used to decide on the quality of the data that a user is reporting,
allowing the MCS application to discard fake data provided by dishonest crowd sensors. Finally,
the reward and reputation mechanism provided by PaySense comes also with a privacy guarantee.
PaySense is a privacy-preserving system, so it is designed to keep users’ anonymity regarding the
information involved in the PaySense system. However, a cautionary note on users’ anonymity has
to be indicated when integrating PaySense with an MCS application. Depending on the specific
data that the MCS application collects, the users’ identity may be revealed by different techniques.
For instance, a user’s identity can be easily revealed through his or her position provided by the
GPS sensor data, and other studies reported that only four spatiotemporal points are sufficient to
identify users [22]. Such threads are beyond the PaySense anonymity measures and have to be
mitigated using properly anonymizing techniques on the collected data, like those proposed by
Shin et al. in [23].
4.1. PaySense Architecture Overview
The architecture of a common MCS application comprises two main layers, as described by
Ganti et al. in [35]: an upper layer where the sensed data are gathered and all of the processing takes
places and a lower layer or sensor layer where the crowd sensor and all device-specific components
reside. Then, all communications take place directly between these two layers. PaySense uses this
same base architecture to facilitate integration and introduces a middle layer, the Bitcoin network,
which provides a common framework to implement privacy-aware incentive and reputation models
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1. PaySense architecture and entities.
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In the PaySense architecture, each crowd sensor collects information about his or her surrounding
environment following a participatory sensing paradigm and, then, sends the sensed data over
conventional communication networks to the Data Collection Server (DCS). However, before sending
sensed data to the DCS, crowd sensors must first obtain a Bitcoin address certificate from the
Address Certification Authority (ACA), which enables them to receive rewards and reputation
updates in the form of bitcoin payments for the sensing tasks they perform. Therefore, the
Bitcoin network is integrated in the PaySense architecture as an additional transport layer for
reputation and rewarding, while standard network communication channels are used for sensor
data transfer.
4.2. PaySense Entities
The PaySense system is composed of different entities, some of them standard entities of any
MCS system, and some others are specifically designed for the proposed system.
The Crowd Sensors (CS) are those entities in charge of sensing activities. Each crowd sensor, CSi,
collects data from his or her surrounding environment and sends them to the Data Collection Server
(DCS). They are identified in the PaySense system through multiple Bitcoin certified addresses, that is
Addrji for j = 1, · · · , n. Note that the concept of a certified address does not exist in the Bitcoin system,
but is a characteristicof PaySense as described in Section 4.3. Each Bitcoin address has an associated
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) key pair, (Pkji , Sk
j
i), and is constructed from the
public portion of such a key pair as follows: Addrji = f (Pk
j
i) for a publicly-known cryptographic hash
function f (·). Since Bitcoin addresses basically result in random alphanumeric characters, crowd
sensors can use them as pseudonyms when communicating with other entities in order to preserve
their anonymity. For that reason, we use both notations, namely Bitcoin address and crowd sensor
pseudonym, indistinctly. Furthermore, the use of Bitcoin addresses allows crowd sensors to transact
with other PaySense entities or even other Bitcoin users.
The Address Certification Authority (ACA) is the entity that certifies Bitcoin addresses so that
those addresses could be accepted in the PaySense system. Each Bitcoin address Addrji for j = 1, · · · , n
owned by a crowd sensor CSi must be certified by the ACA in order to provide some degree of
control over all existing users of the Bitcoin network and to avoid a Sybil attack. The Bitcoin address
certificates, Cert(Addrji), are issued following the X.509v3 standard and with the ACA acting as issuing
certification authority. The goal of the certification process is two-fold: on the one hand, it ensures that
CSi cannot use more than one Bitcoin address at a given time, and on the other hand, it ensures that
Bitcoin addresses are renewed periodically given the expiration date of the certificate, which actually
limits the validity of the Bitcoin address itself . Although Bitcoin addresses do not expire, we apply the
concept of expiration to the certificate issued by the ACA. When a certificate address expires, such an
address cannot be used in the MCS system, but it is still a valid and usable standard Bitcoin address.
The Data Collection Server (DCS) is the entity that represents the MCS application server in
charge of receiving and processing the sensed data sent by the crowd sensors. The DCS must perform
a validation process on the received data and, based on its correctness, gives rewards to the crowd
sensors providing such data. Rewards are provided through a Bitcoin transaction, and for that purpose,
the DCS also holds a publicly-known Bitcoin address, AddrDCS, and an ECDSA key pair associated
with it. Such an address is publicly known by all crowd sensors, and it is used exclusively to reward
crowd sensors for their readings through the Bitcoin network.
The Bitcoin P2P network, although not a real entity of the PaySense architecture, is used
in the system to transfer bitcoins between PaySense certified Bitcoin addresses. Furthermore,
the transaction information stored in the blockchain will be further used to assess the correctness of
the PaySense system.
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4.3. PaySense Interaction Model
In this section, we describe the different interactions between PaySense entities that are performed
to execute all processes involved in our system.
4.3.1. Crowd Sensor Enrollment
When a crowd sensor CSi wants to join the PaySense system for the first time, he or she must
request a Bitcoin address certificate from the ACA by sending a certificate request, CerReq(Addrji).
As we already mentioned, the certificate is a standard X.509 certificate, so the certificate requests
contain the address Addrji in the subject common name field. The real identity of the crowd sensor is
required at this step in order to validate that he or she did not ask for another Bitcoin address certificate
in the past trying to make a “fresh start” and preventing a Sybil attack. Then, the ACA verifies that the
Bitcoin address has a zero balance (i.e., does not contain any bitcoins) to ensure that CSi does not enter
the system with a previously-assigned reputation score and issues a new Bitcoin address certificate
Cert(Addrji). Note that such a certificate guarantees that Bitcoin payments are being performed only
for Bitcoin addresses owned by registered crowd sensors.
However, it is straightforward to notice that if CSi sends his or her CerReq(Addr
j
i) directly, then
the ACA could link Addrji to CSi’s real identity. To avoid this from happening, we adopt a blind
signature scheme as follows:
1. CSi generates n different Bitcoin addresses (j = 1, · · · , n) and for each one computes the certificate
request, CerReq(Addrji), and obtains its hash value, h(CerReq(Addr
j
i)).
2. CSi blinds each of the n hash values obtained in Step 1, b
j
i = Blind(h(CerReq( Addr
j
i))) for
j = 1, · · · , n, and sends the n hashed values to the ACA together with CSi’s real identity. The
blinding factor depends on the selected digital signature. Although it has been represented as
a function for clarity, the blinding factor is a specific unrelated value for each different CerReq
to blind.
3. The ACA randomly selects one of the received blinded hash values, namely bki , and requests
from CSi both the unblind factor and the CerReq(Addr
j
i) for the rest of the values j = 1, · · · ,
k− 1, k + 1, · · · , n. Then, the ACA extracts the n− 1 Bitcoin addresses contained in the received
CerReq and verifies that all of them have a zero balance. Then, the ACA uses the unblinding
factors to unblind each bji for j = 1, · · · , k− 1, k + 1, · · · , n and checks that the unblinded values
match with the hash values of the received CerReq.
4. If all verifications performed by the ACA in Step 3 hold, the ACA signs the blinded value bki and
sends the result SigSkACA(b
k
i ) to CSi.
5. Upon reception, CSi unblinds the digital signature SigSkACA(b
k
i ) performed by the ACA and uses
the unblinded result together with the original CerReq(Addrki ) value to create the certificate:
Cert(Addrji).
Notice that although the ACA is signing a blind certificate, the cut-and-choose technique included
in Step 3 ensures that a dishonest crowd sensor cannot obtain an arbitrary signature from the ACA
with a better probability than 1n .
4.3.2. Micropayment Channel Setup
In order to perform CSs rewarding, the DCS issues smart contracts [36] to every crowd sensor.
A micropayment channel [37] is established with each one of those crowd sensors, allowing the DCS
to pay for the users’ readings while avoiding paying high transaction fees.
The DCS sets up such micropayment channels by sharing a Bitcoin address with each user, where
signatures from both parts are necessary to perform transactions. The micropayment channel is created
during the CS enrollment and has the same expiration date as the CS certificate. New contracts will be
issued after the address renewal.
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4.3.3. Sensing and Reporting Data
Once in possession of a certified address, crowd sensors can begin to report sensed data to the DCS.
Prior to its transmission, the data are first digitally signed using the crowd sensor’s secret key, that
is sigdata = SigSkji
(data), and later on, encrypted with the public key of the DCS. Then, each crowd
sensor constructs the following sensing report: Report = EPKDCS{data, sigdata, Cert(Addrji)}.
Since the DCS is a central entity in the system, it is straight forward to provide his or her public
key for encryption to all CSs of the system, using, for instance, the ACA during the crowd sensor
enrollment. Notice, however, that the public key of a Bitcoin address is not a good choice as an
encryption key since signing keys are strongly not intended for use together with encryption processes.
Although data encryption and the signature could imply some energy consumption in the crowd
sensor device, in contrast to [38] where an SSL channel is established between the data sensor and the
collection center, our proposal only encrypts and signs the sensed data, avoiding the overload that
crypto-network protocols imply, for instance in the hand shake or in the shared key establishment.
Furthermore, notice that our proposal uses elliptic curve cryptography, which deals with shorter keys
and that has been demonstrated suitable for mobile devices [39].
Reports are sent over conventional communication networks to the DCS. Note that, our
data-centric approach also allows the sensed information to pass through a multi-hop network,
since no secure channel is required, but the source of such information could still be identified by the
digital signature.
4.3.4. Verification and Validation of Sensed Data
For each report received from a CS, the following validations are performed by the DCS:
1. Decrypts the report using his or her private key: DSKDCS{EPKDCS{data, sigdata, Cert(Addr
j
i)}} =
{data, sigdata, Cert(Addrji)}
2. Verifies that the data were sent by a registered crowd sensor. For that purpose, the DCS verifies
the correctness of Cert(Addrji).
3. Validates the source authenticity of the data by verifying the digital signature included in the
report, that is Ver
Pkji
(sigdata) = data.
4. Applies a validation process on the data themselves to assess their quality.
If all validations are correct, the DCS provides a job reward and proceeds to update the reputation
of the crowd sensor.
Notice that the data validation process performed in the last step is obviously application
dependent. However, we assume that the reputation value of the crowd sensors who send the data
will be involved in the validation process (i.e., crowd sensors with a higher reputation are supposed to
provide more accurate data). Such information is publicly stored in the Bitcoin blockchain, and the
DCS can perform a crowd sensor reputation query (see the next interaction) to determine the level of
trustworthiness of the crowd sensor and, consequently, the correctness of the contributed data.
4.3.5. Crowd Sensor Reputation Query
The reputation value of a crowd sensor is equivalent to the sum of all of the DCS payments to that
particular Bitcoin address. Furthermore, this information is publicly available in the blockchain
database of the Bitcoin network. However, the DCS stores the current reputation of each CS.
The purpose of such a store is two-fold: on the one hand, for efficiency, avoiding querying the
blockchain for every CS reputation query and, on the other hand, for consistency reasons, because the
actual reputation of a given CS is not updated in the blockchain until his or her current smart contract
has ended.
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In this way, the reputation of a PaySense user could be calculated as follows:
Reputation = trans f erred_reputation + earned_reputation− reputation_reduction
where earned_reputation refers to the reputation earned by the CS and paid by the DCS,
trans f erred_reputation refers to the reputation transferred between the user’s pseudonyms and
reputation_reduction refers to possible user punishment for misbehaving. The last two concepts
will be shown in the transfer reputation protocol.
4.3.6. Job Rewarding and Reputation Update
Once the sensed data have been validated, the user has to be rewarded and his or her reputation
updated. Since in PaySense, both values are tied to a Bitcoin payment, the reputation update will
determine the rewarding value. Again, the specific MCS application will define its suitable reputation
model, which will determine the increasing amount of reputation score when users act properly
in the system and provide correct readings. Once the increase on the reputation value has been
established, the DCS transfers such reputation to the user by performing a micropayment using the
micropayment channel previously established. The value of the payment will be the exact amount of
reputation increment.
4.3.7. Withdrawal of Rewarded Coins
At any time, crowd sensors can withdraw the bitcoins received as payments from the DCS, since
there is no difference between a certified Bitcoin address and a standard one, from a transactional
perspective. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that, according to the PaySense model of interaction,
a withdrawal of funds implies a reduction in the reputation value associated with that Bitcoin address.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that, as we will see in the transfer reputation protocol, the enforcing of
withdrawal must be performed in order to provide unlinkability between pseudonyms. This reputation
will become out of the system, but will be earned by the user as bitcoins.
4.3.8. Transferring Reputation to a New Address
Before the Bitcoin address certificate expires, the crowd sensor has to obtain a new certificate from
the ACA. Such certification renewal is especially sensitive because the Bitcoin address that is certified
acts as a crowd sensor pseudonym. Then, in the process of transferring reputation to a new address,
in order to provide a privacy-preserving mechanism, different constraints have to be meet:
• The ACA should not learn about the CS identity.
• The ACA should not link the old and the new address of a particular CS.
• The CS should not be able to increase his or her reputation.
From a CS real identity disclosure point of view, PaySense deals with those constraints by using a
Bitcoin mixing process, described in the next section.
4.4. Transfer Reputation Protocol
Since PaySense uses Bitcoin addresses to store the reputation value for each CS, the reputation
transfer is performed through a payment between Bitcoin addresses. However, due to the openness of
the Bitcoin blockchain ledger, standard Bitcoin payments disclose both the sender and the receiver
of a payment, and according to the constraints enumerated above, they are not suitable for a
privacy-preserving reputation transfer.
In order to enhance the anonymity properties of the Bitcoin transactions and to use them for
reputation transfer, we propose the use of mixing services, a procedure that shuffles the information
in order to hinder the relation between the input and the output values of a transaction. The goal
of Bitcoin mixing is to allow Bitcoin users to send bitcoins from one address to a mixing service
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and to receive from the mixing service the bitcoins to another address that could not be linked with
the original one. Different mixing techniques have been proposed in the recent literature [40–42],
each of them presenting different properties. For implementing PaySense, we chose the CoinJoin
approach [40], since, although its main drawback is the need for a central server taking part in the
mixing protocol, in our scenario, we already have such a central entity, since the ACA has to take an
active part in the reputation transfer (issuing new certificates), so he or she can play the role of such a
central server needed in the CoinJoin protocol.
The main idea of the PaySense transfer reputation protocol is to build a transaction that we call
the reputation transfer transaction, where multiple CSs will transfer their reputations jointly from the
old Bitcoin addresses to their new ones, hindering the link between input and output addresses.
The greater the number of CSs involved in the protocol, the higher the anonymity reached.
In order to create the reputation transfer transaction, we use a method based on the CoinJoin mixing
technique. CoinJoin takes advantage of the low level transaction structure using a multiparty protocol
where different actors do not obtain any knowledge that could reveal the link between the input and
output addresses of such a transaction. In order to understand the proposed protocol for the reputation
transfer, we have to review some details of the Bitcoin transaction structure.
4.4.1. Bitcoin Transaction Structure
Bitcoin payments are performed through Bitcoin transactions. A Bitcoin transaction is formed by
two basic parts, the input block and the output block, as shown in Figure 2. In the simplest Bitcoin
transaction, the input block and the output block contain exactly one single address.
Inputs block Outputs block
Input 0 ...Input 1 Input n ...Output 0 Output 1 Output n
Signature
Input (detailed) Output (detailed)
Index Amount OutputBitcoinAddress
PrevTx PrevOutIndex Amount
Unspent transaction output
        (UTXO)
Figure 2. High level representation of a Bitcoin transaction.
When a user wants to perform a Bitcoin payment, he or she should build a transaction, including
a set of non-spent previous transaction, also known as unspent transaction outputs (utxos), in the input
block. The total Bitcoin amount of the inputs should be at least the amount to be spent. In addition,
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a list of outputs should be placed in the output block, representing the Bitcoin addresses to which the
user wants to pay and the amount of bitcoins to be paid. The transaction input block represents the
budget that the user has to spend and references the previous transactions where the money comes
from, and the output block represents how the money is spent. Once the input and output addresses
of the transaction are selected, the total transaction has to be signed. The standard Bitcoin transaction
signature is performed by signing the transaction (inputs and outputs) with each private key related to
the Bitcoin addresses where the funds come from; in other words, from each private key of the Bitcoin
addresses referenced in the input block. For each input address, the signature is computed over the
whole transaction value (inputs and outputs), and each signature is stored in the corresponding input
of the input block as depicted in Figure 2.
Notice that with this procedure, no link could be established between transaction inputs and
outputs, since each signature is performed over the same base information. Furthermore, the base
information to be signed (inputs and outputs) has to be built before any transaction signature
is performed.
4.4.2. Transfer Reputation Protocol Description
Once the basic Bitcoin transaction format has been described, we can provide a high level
description of our transfer reputation protocol. In such a protocol, different CSs create a reputation transfer
transaction with the help of the ACA. First of all, every CS indicates his or her Bitcoin PaySense certified
address as the input address and a new Bitcoin address as the output. Such a new address will be
the new certified address for the new period. All of this information will be sent to the ACA, who
would build the base information transaction, the data that each CS have to sign in order to validate
the transaction. Then, the ACA sends the base information transaction to the CSs, and each of them
performs the corresponding signature and returns the value to the ACA. Upon signature reception,
the ACA builds the reputation transfer transaction with the base information transaction that he or she
has created plus every signature received from the CSs and sends this to the Bitcoin network to be
included into the blockchain. Finally, the ACA certifies all output addresses included in the reputation
transfer transaction.
In Figure 3, the transfer reputation protocol is depicted. To avoid the disclosure of the link between
the inputs and the outputs of the reputation transfer transaction, the ACA performs the data collection in
five different and independent stages, recollecting different data in some of them. Moreover, the ACA
is accessible to collect data from the CS only through the Tor network [43], being the web application
offered by the ACA built as a Tor hidden service.
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Figure 3. Transfer reputation protocol with two crowd sensors.
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Stage 1: Input recollection. The first stage consists of recollecting the inputs of the reputation
transfer transaction.
1. The ACA advertises a hidden service for transferring a predetermined and fixed reputation value
R between certified Bitcoin addresses and new ones.
2. The ACA randomly generates, for later use, an output stage hidden service address, duration
and starting time.
3. Crowd sensors with a certified Bitcoin address with reputation equal to or greater than the fixed
R may join the protocol by sending a utxo with the exact value R. Notice that only one input per
crowd sensor is allowed.
4. In case any CS does not have a single utxo of value R to send to the mixing service, he or she
could perform an reputation unifying transaction to create it (described in the next subsection).
The new generated utxo will be sent as the input.
5. The ACA verifies that each crowd sensor trying to participate in the protocol has at least a
reputation score of R, including possible reputation reduction punishment for misbehaving.
6. The ACA verifies that each received input comes from a valid source. There are only three
valid sources: the DCS, a previously-certified Bitcoin address and the same address itself.
Transactions from the DCS are bound to the earned reputation that have been paid by the system
to the user. Transactions from a previous certified Bitcoin address are bound to transferred
reputation and are limited to just one per address (the very first one actually). Finally, transactions
from the same address are bound to a reputation unifying transaction (see the next subsection
for details).
7. The ACA sends the output stage hidden service address, duration and starting time to each CS
whose inputs have been accepted.
8. The ACA ends such an input recollection stage after a predefined time discarding any input with
a value different from R.
Stage 2: Output recollection. In the second stage, all outputs of the reputation transfer transaction
are collected.
1. Crowd sensors that have already sent the input in the previous stage now send the output. Again,
only a single output for each crowd sensor is allowed.
2. The ACA validates that all of the outputs have an exact value of R.
3. The ACA, using the inputs and outputs received in the first and second stages, constructs the
base non-signed reputation transfer transaction.
4. The ACA ends the output recollection stage after a predefined time.
Stage 3: Address commitment. In the third stage, the ACA openly publishes the output stage hidden
service address.
• The ACA publishes the output stage hidden service address he or she has sent to the participating
CS in Stage 1.
• Each CS could now check that the previously-provided output stage hidden service address
matches with that openly published.
• The ACA ends the stage after a predefined time.
Stage 4: Signature recollection. In the fourth stage, the reputation transfer transaction is distributively signed.
1. Crowd sensors request the base non-signed reputation transfer transaction from the ACA.
2. Crowd sensors sign the obtained value and send the result to the ACA.
3. The ACA checks the correctness of every provided signature.
4. The ACA composes the reputation transfer transaction with the base non-signed transaction that he
or she built in the second stage and each of the signatures received from each crow sensor.
5. Finally, the ACA pushes the resulting reputation transfer transaction to the Bitcoin P2P network to
be included in the blockchain.
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Stage 5: Address certification. In the last stage, the ACA generates and publishes the new certificates
corresponding to the output addresses of the reputation transfer transaction.
1. Crowd sensors validate that the reputation transfer transaction has been published in the blockchain
and that his or her reputation has effectively been transferred to the new Bitcoin address.
2. Crowd sensors send to the ACA the public key corresponding to the Bitcoin address where the
reputation has been transferred.
3. The ACA verifies that the received public key matches one of the Bitcoin addresses included as
output in the reputation transfer transaction and that the address has only one payment related to
it. If the validation is correct, he or she sends the new certificate to the crowd sensor.
4.4.3. Reputation Unifying Transaction
As described in the Bitcoin protocol, utxos must be spent entirely each time a transaction is
performed. This makes it especially complicated to find a unique utxo that matches the amount of
reputation that a certain user wants to transfer to their new pseudonym. Moreover, taking into account
that reputation will be passed though multiple pseudonyms over time, finding a suitable utxo is
even harder. In order to solve this, CSs will perform a previous step to unify the desired amount
of reputation. To doing so, a CS willing to perform a reputation exchange will create a transaction
being himself or herself (his or her certified Bitcoin address) both the source and destination of the
transaction, using the necessary utxos to reach the desired amount of reputation. The newly-generated
utxo will be the chosen one in the transfer reputation protocol. It is important to stress that in order to
provide unlinkability and since multiple crowd sensors will act together to build the reputation transfer
transaction, every crowd sensor has to reduce his or her reputation a bit, to an amount that matches R,
as pointed out in the reputation transaction protocol.
4.5. PaySense Integration with Existing MCS Systems
As we already pointed out, PaySense is proposed as a plug-in for any MCS application that
wants to reward its users to increase their engagement in the crowd sensing tasks. For that reason, its
implementation is tied to a main MCS application to which PaySense will be integrated. PaySense
extends the functionality of the two main actors of the MCS application, which are: the DCS and the
CSs; and also including a new actor responsible for address certification and involved in the transfer
reputation protocol: the ACA.
The first modification needed in an MCS system to allow a PaySense integration is that CSs have
to be identified only by means of a bitcoin address. This main property may affect how the DCS stores
CSs information and interactions and also how CSs deal with its identity.
Secondly, for the PaySense integration, the DCS needs to run a Bitcoin wallet in order to reward
users’ reports with bitcoins. A wide range of wallets could be deployed within the DCS; however, we
suggest the reference implementation client [44], since it is endorsed by the Bitcoin Core developers.
Payments performed with this wallet should replace the rewarding mechanism of the MCS system.
Furthermore, integration of PaySense in the DCS system also involves the data validation process. In
order to obtain reliable data, the DCS should apply a validation process to all of the users’ reports.
PaySense suggests to use the reporter’s reputation in such a process, a value that is provided to the
MCS system through the crowd sensor reputation query interaction (see Section 4.3.5 for details) and that
can be used to create or complement the internal validation process that the MCS has defined.
As far as CSs are concerned, two main functionalities are needed in order to integrate PaySense:
a Bitcoin wallet and a Tor network connection. The wallet is needed to create the CS pseudonym,
the bitcoin address and to check the benefit obtained from the reported sensing. The wallet also
allows one to transfer reputation between addresses and to cash some (or all) received bitcoins.
Different types of wallets could be used depending on the resource restrictions of the CS, from the
reference implementation client, to Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) clients, such as bitcoinj [45]
or Electrum [46]. The Tor connection will be necessary to interact with the ACA during the transfer
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reputation protocol, since the service is only available through the anonymization network. Any CS’s
pseudonym modification restriction may be disabled from the original application, as PaySense
identifies his or her CSs with Bitcoin addresses previously certified by the ACA, and the change of the
pseudonym is a system requirement in order to preserve users’ anonymity. In addition, every CS may
include a module to perform ECDSA signatures and to encrypt messages to report data to the DCS.
Finally, the ACA should be deployed as a new server entity separate from the DCS. The ACA
has the core capabilities of a traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certification authority, such as
certificate generation, maintenance and revocation, but it also takes an important role in the transfer
reputation protocol. In such a protocol, the ACA builds Bitcoin transactions, but instead of standard
generation, it acts as a mixer without being involved with its own addresses. All of those protocols
in which the ACA takes part have been provided as an open source Python implementation [6] and
comes along with a Python utils package [47].
5. Security Analysis
In previous sections, we have described the PaySense functionality showing how different entities
that are part of the system interact with each other, providing different kinds of information and
performing a wide range of tasks that conform to the PaySense functionality. However, some of the
actors could misbehave during the system lifetime; the reason why every interaction should be as
secure as possible. In this section, we describe our adversary model, and we analyze how the system
provides a high security level in relation to different attacks.
5.1. Adversary Model
Our adversary model can be divided into two different categories: external and internal attackers.
On the one hand, an external attacker is an attacker that is not part of the system, but tries to disrupt
its correct functionality. As an external entity, we assume that he or she has no internal information;
mainly, he or she does not have a certified Bitcoin address by the ACA. However, the external attacker
may have standard Bitcoin addresses that may contain some balance. On the other hand, an internal
attacker could be either a CS, the ACA or the DCS. As we will analyze later, the objectives of an internal
attacker differ depending on his or her role in the system. Furthermore, notice that an internal attacker
is, obviously, more powerful than an external one. In fact, all possible attacks described by an external
attacker can be performed by an internal one, from the point of view of the knowledge needed to
perform the attack.
Next, we enumerate the possible objectives of an external attacker:
1. CS identity disclosure aims to discover the identity of a certain user. It could be divided into
two degrees depending on the level of disclosure: full disclosure, where the pseudonym is linked
with the user’s identity, and pseudonym linkability, where two or more pseudonyms are known
to belong to the same user.
2. Certificate tampering consists of the inclusion of fake data inside a certificate to get some
additional gain during the registration.
3. The CS data sensing tampering objective is to generate fake data and to try to pass it off as correct
or to modify some data originally created by some user in such a way that it becomes false.
4. The Sybil attack provides a single attacker with more than one pseudonym in the system, that is
multiple identities.
5. The DoS attack consists of interrupting the normal system behavior. Traditionally, general
DoS attacks are usually related to low level implementation details or integration specificities.
We do not intend to address this kind of attack, but those DoS attacks related to high level
protocol dysfunctions.
The objectives of internal attackers depend on the attacker role. Objective attacks for the CS are
the following:
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1. A fraudulent reputation increase is a group of attacks where an attacker tampers with the
information provided to the system in order to obtain more reputation than the supposed one.
Four attacks fit inside this group: fake reward attack, target reputation attack, stale address attack
and reputation injection attack.
2. Steal rewards consist of changing the reported data in such a way that it looks like the attacker is
the original issuer, and therefore, the reward is assigned to him or her.
3. Data sensing poisoning aims to send fake information to the DCS in order to spread this
information over the network taking some advantage with it.
4. A fraudulent reward increase occurs when a certain reward is paid more than once to the same
user for the same provided data.
CS also shares the following objectives with external attackers:
5. CS data sensing tampering.
6. Sybil attack.
7. DoS attack.
Finally, we assume that both the DCS and the ACA act honestly, since they are the main running
parties of the system, and most of the attacks envisaged so far do not make sense. We assume that the
dishonest behavior from those entities is restricted to an identity disclosure attack, both trying to learn
either the real identity of the CS or the linkability of his or her pseudonyms.
In order to simplify the analysis, when the same objective is pursued by different entities,
we perform a single analysis using the most restrictive case. For instance, an attack trying to disclose
the CS identity can be performed by the ACA, by the DCS, by another CS and by an external attacker.
Since the ACA is the entity that has more information from the process of enrollment and reputation
transfer, ensuring that the ACA cannot disclose the CS identity extends such a property to other entities
that have less information to perform the same attack.
5.2. Security Measures
The first attack we analyze is the CS identity disclosure. As we already mentioned, this attack
can be divided into two different objectives. Disclose the real identity of the CS or provide linkability
across multiple pseudonyms (certified addresses) of the CS. The entity with the most privileged
position in trying to disclose users’ identity is the ACA.
The ACA could try to link a pseudonym with the real user’s identity during the process of
enrollment, since it is the only time both attributes (real identity and CS pseudonym) are provided
together. Nonetheless, the CS will end up using the only pseudonym from the n provided ones, which
the ACA does not know anything about, since the ACA will perform a blind signature to produce the
certificate that contains it.
Pseudonym linkability, on the other hand, could be attempted by the ACA during the transfer
reputation protocol, since the process requires CSs to provide their current and new pseudonyms.
Nevertheless, all communications between the ACA and every CS are performed using a Tor
anonymous network and hidden services; then, the ACA will not succeed in such an attack unless a
CS makes unappropriated usage of the network.
At first glance, this should be enough to avoid a malicious ACA from learning about users’ identity.
Unfortunately, it is not. If the ACA misbehaves, he or she could send different server addresses to each
of the participants, linking in this way the inputs with the outputs of the reputation transfer transaction
and, if the transaction is finally signed and published, being able to disclose the link between old
and new CS pseudonyms. PaySense deals with this kind of threat by forcing the ACA to commit to
a random, unique and verifiable output stage hidden service address for each reputation transaction
protocol instance. If any of the participants notices that both addresses do not match, he or she could
refuse to sign the transaction, forcing it to be invalid, and therefore, rejected by the Bitcoin network.
It is important to stress that even a link between pseudonyms could be built by a misbehaving ACA
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after the output stage, he or she will end up learning nothing at all, since the transaction will not be
published, and new pseudonyms will be freshly generated for a future reputation transaction.
Launching a certificate tampering attack is another way for a malicious user to achieve some
non-earned reputation. In such an attack, the attacker may try to insert any kind of fake information
inside the certificate to be signed, taking advantage of the fact that the ACA performs a blind signature.
Even though modifying some X.509 certificate fields could be detrimental for the CS, such as including
an invalid issuer, other information could give him or her some advantage over the rest of the users.
Using a non-fresh Bitcoin address is a perfect example of this. If an attacker provides a Bitcoin address
containing some balance, he or she could end up being enrolled in the system with non-zero reputation.
While this is a valid attack that a malicious user can try to perform, the success provability can be
made arbitrarily low. An attacker performing such an attack will only succeed with a probability of
1/n, being n the total number of certificates requested by the ACA during the registration process.
Moreover, since the user’s identity is provided during the process, if a user is caught up trying to
perform such an attack, he or she could be banned from the system.
CS data sensing tampering is a different attack of which to be aware. It is based on a well-known
privacy disclosure attack, the Man in the Middle (MiM). The attack consists of a modification of the
data sent by a certain CS to the DCS in a way that the information provided becomes false. The main
objective of such an attack is to undermine the reputation of the targeted CS. As long as the information
provided by the CS to the DCS is digitally signed by his or her issuer, the DCS would not accept the
information, and the attack will not succeed.
An attacker may try to launch a Sybil attack to obtain an additional pseudonym. Even though
the system is specially designed to avoid such attacks, an incorrect usage from the users could give an
attacker an opportunity to do so. The only way for an attacker to perform such an attack is through an
incorrect management of another user’s keys. As long as an attacker is able to steal another user keys,
he or she could not only steal all of the funds in the account related to it, but also obtain an additional
pseudonym by performing a transfer reputation protocol. If the attacker could get a new pseudonym
from a reputation transfer before the real user could notice the key was stolen, that pseudonym will be
untraceable according to the unlinkability property of such a process. This kind of problem comes
from the Bitcoin transaction irreversibility, and it is inherent to the Bitcoin design. If a user loses his or
her keys, there is nothing to do. Proper key management is required when Bitcoin comes into play.
We will follow the analysis by evaluating the possible Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. To do so,
we should consider which points of the system are potentially points of failure, or, the same, the attack
of which parts of the system will result in an interruption of normal PaySense behavior. Following
this approach, the most conflictive point is the one where more actors interact together: the transfer
reputation protocol.
From a security analysis perspective, the main drawback of the transfer reputation protocol is that
the number of inputs, outputs and signatures, provided at different stages of the protocol, must
match in order to build and broadcast the reputation transfer transaction. Otherwise, all of the data are
discarded, and no reputation is transferred.
The input recollection stage being our first point of analysis, it is straightforward to notice that no
tampering could be performed, since the ACA will discard any non-valid input after being checked.
On the contrary, the output recollection is easier to attack, as it is expected that only users who have
sent inputs to the previous stage send the corresponding output in the next stage. Any user could try
to send a random output resulting in a non-matching number of inputs and outputs. If this situation is
detected by the ACA, the transaction will be conclusively discarded. To avoid suck an attack, PaySense
randomizes the output stage starting time, duration and the server address where it will take place,
limiting the ability to perform the attack to those involved in the input stage. Using this approach, an
address involved in the input stage of different protocols’ performances that has suffered a DoS attack
could be banned.
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A similar DoS attack could be used in the signature recollection stage, since again, no link is
established between users participating in previous stages, allowing any user to send fake signatures
to the ACA. However, no threat is presented through this approach, since the ACA could use the
digital certificates associated with every Bitcoin address to check the correctness of each signature
before including it into the transaction (notice that the ACA knows where each signature has to be
placed and which CS has participated in the protocol). Therefore, duplicated and wrong signatures
will be discarded. Finally, a malicious user could force the transaction to be discarded by not sending
his or her signature. However, the malicious user will be automatically pointed out and, therefore,
punished for it.
Following the approach of information tampering, a fraudulent reputation increase is a
considerable big group of attacks aiming to provide wrong information to the system in order to obtain
some amount of non-earned reputation. As mentioned before, four different attacks fit inside this
group: fake reward attack, target reputation attack, stale address attack and reputation injection attack.
First of all, a CS could try to perform a fake reward attack by performing payments from addresses
outside the system to his or her certified address, in order to increase his or her reputation. Since,
in the transfer reputation protocol, the reputation is computed using only transactions from a certified
address, or from the DCS, the reputation score of a CS cannot be increased using such an attack.
A CS could also try to increase his or her reputation through a target reputation attack, by
participating in a transfer reputation protocol with a reputation target R higher than his or her actual
reputation. Since the ACA checks all of the provided inputs of the transfer reputation protocol, the
attacker’s input will be rejected.
Moreover, a CS could try to take advantage of a stale address attack to increase his or her
reputation fraudulently. To do so, he or she could send a non-freshly-generated Bitcoin address to
the output stage of the transfer reputation protocol to earn the balance associated with that address as
reputation during the certification process. Since the ACA checks that every address sent to the output
recollection stage has zero balance, the output will be discarded, and the attack will not succeed.
A variation of the previous attack, the reputation injection attack, could also be performed
by a malicious CS. In this case, a freshly-generated Bitcoin address will be sent to the output
recollection stage, but a transaction will be performed from another address to that one before the
certification process. Even in this case, the address will not be certified since the ACA checks that
the address to be certified has only one utxo related to it, and that utxo belongs to a reputation transfer
transaction. Moreover, since the address will not be certified, but the reputation transfer transaction
would be published, the reputation transferred to the attackers’ address will became out of the
system permanently.
Steal rewards is a different kind of attack where a malicious user aims to obtain some non-earned
reputation. It is similar to the previously-introduced CS data sensing tampering, but its purpose differs.
The attack lies in a malicious user changing the issuer field of a report to himself or herself (his or her
certified pseudonym) and performing a new signature over the data as if he or she were the original
issuer. In this way, the possible rewards for the data sensing and reporting will be assigned to the
attacker instead of the original issuer. PaySense deals with this kind of data modification attack by
encrypting the communications between CSs and the DCS, since every user knows the DCS public key.
Following a different approach, data sensing poisoning could be used to achieve two of the
previously pointed out objectives together: increasing the reputation of one or more CS and providing
the wrong information to the system to take some external advantage. In order to perform this attack, a
group of users should agree in reporting the same kind of fake information. If the number of reporters
is big enough, the data could end up being accepted and the attackers rewarded for it. Protection
against this type of attack depends on the data validation procedure applied (see Section 4.3.4), and
as we already mentioned, it is application dependent. PaySense provides a reputation system for
applications to validate information and to avoid such kinds of attacks. The interested reader could
refer to [19] for detailed information of the data validation through users’ reputation.
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Moreover, if an attack like this is detected by the DCS, malicious users will be punished with a
reputation reduction. Hence, each time an attack is detected, the power of malicious users is reduced.
Finally, a fraudulent reward increase is the last attack of our analysis. As in the steal rewards
attack, the attacker aims to obtain some non-earned reputation, but in this case, it is not stolen from
another user, but obtained by duplicating readings. However, the DCS will not reward duplicated
reports (i.e., same information from the same issuer), so the attack will not succeed.
6. Conclusions and Further Research
With MCS arising as a new sensing paradigm, new singular research challenges are introduced,
such as fostering participation among the crowd sensors, ensuring the trustworthiness of the
contributed data since counterfeit information may be contributed by malicious individuals and,
at the same time, preserving the anonymity of the crowd sensors.
We have presented PaySense, a framework that addresses in a practical way all of the
aforementioned challenges together, using the Bitcoin network as an integrating solution. Crowd
sensors contribute sensed data using certified Bitcoin addresses and reputation and rewards are
mapped to a single bitcoin funds transfer, which can later be spent by their owners. Using such
an approach, our system inherits the privacy-preserving properties that bitcoins present. As a
main contribution, our proposal solves the problem of reputation transfer satisfactorily when
dealing with anonymous scenarios. Previous proposals impose a reduction of each user reputation
when transferring the reputation between pseudonyms without any other benefit than preserving
unlinkability between pseudonyms. In our solution, pseudonym unlinkability comes for free since the
reduction of the reputation is transformed in an economical profit thanks to the fact that reputation is
expressed directly in bitcoins.
Further extensions of the proposed system may be directed to enable a single ACA shared by
multiple MCS applications or even by other applications outside the field of MCS, enabling users to
create a global digital reputation score useful in multiple environments. Furthermore, further research
has to be directed toward analyzing the behavior of different reputation models when reward and
reputation are considered as a whole.
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